This online appendix details the robustness chcks that are discussed in SECTION V in the main paper, as well as details on the technical rules for calculation of the mandatory transfers (FPM) and the detailed ideological classification of parties throughout the period 1997-2012.
novelty here is that even when the municipality belongs to an aligned state, it receives an extra 3.7 reals (1.89 US dollars) if the Mayor is aligned with the President. However, this holds only at the 10% confidence level in Model 6
and it is much smaller in absolute values, which also supports the SPTH against the TPTH. Table A1 . Robust and instrumental variable fixed effects regression estimates of the effects of political identification on discretionary transfers in Brazil, 1997 Brazil, -2012 
A2. Per GDP variables
Our main econometric study used the per capita, per GDP discretionary transfers as the dependent variable.
Alternatively, we could have used simply the discretionary transfers per GDP, rather than dividing by the municipality's population. In that case, we would also use the Local taxes and the Mandatory transfers variables divided only by GDP. 
A3. Regional effects
Encompassing an area of 8.5 million square meters, Brazil is the fifth biggest country in world. It is also one of the most unequal societies, with a Gini coefficient above 50. It is a highly decentralized federation with huge regional gaps. Therefore, it is only natural to ask if the partisan transfers hypothesis is also confirmed at the regional level.
This is the objective of the present section.
Brazilian states are grouped into five regions with different patterns of immigration, history, development and GDP, among others. In order to disaggregate the analysis at the regional level we first created five regional dummy variables, as described below. The regionalized regressions confirm the partisan transfers hypothesis against the WMH for all regions: all regional Mayor-President Only variables have positive statistically significant signs. The coefficients of the regions southeastern (SE), northeastern (NE) and center western (CO) are statically identical and the coefficients of the northern (NO) and southern (SU) regions are also statistically undistinguishable. The former coefficients are below the national mean whereas the latter are above. In other words, the partisan motive in discretionary transfers appears to manifest most strongly at the extreme northern and southern regions. Note that the northern region is the least developed of the five and encompasses most of Brazilian Amazon rain forest, whereas the southern region is one of the most developed and richest of the country.
Three out of five regional Mayor-Governor-President are statistically non-significant (NO, CO, SE), and the two that are significant (the Northeastern and the Southern regions) have opposite sign. The NE Mayor-GovernorPresident variable's sign is negative and, together with the NO, CO and SE, supports the SPTH against the TPTH.
Only the SU Mayor-Governor-President variable does not support the SPTH against the TPTH. Further investigation is need to better understand this result for the Southern region.
The regional Mayor-President's coalition variables are now significant for three out of 5 regions, but with conflicting signs: It is negative for the NO region and positive for the CO and SU regions. This result suggests further investigations on subnational politics to better understand those signs.
The remaining variables, including the president's party ideological bias and the political cycle variables closely reflect the previous estimations, as expected.
A4. Actual transfers
We discussed in section III.A that there are basically two ways to measure discretionary transfers from our new database. The first one, used in this paper, consists of computing the amounts of transfers agreed upon between the federal government and the municipalities when they signed a grant contract, a "Convênio". We argued that these amounts better reflect the possible use of the grants for political promotion purposes. An alternative way is to compute the amounts that are effectively transferred to the municipalities. Table A4 presents the corresponding regressions when the actual transfers dependent variable is used. Comparing Table A4 with Table 5 we confirm that the results we found remain essentially unchanged, corroborating the robustness of the analysis. 
A5. Alternative proxies for local taxation
Our main econometric study used the sum of the three main property taxes: urban (IPTU), rural (ITR) and ownership transfer (ITBR) as the proxy for local taxation. However, the most relevant local tax is the urban property tax IPTU.
Furthermore, we discussed a fourth main source of local income, the tax on services, ISS. In order to check the robustness of our results, we rerun the models first using only IPTU as the proxy for local taxation, and then using all four main taxes, IPTU, ITR, ITBI and ISS. For the sake of space, we present in Table A5 below only the fixed effects IV regression of the three proxies we used. Each IV regression used the corresponding neighboring municipalities' proxy for local taxation as instrument. Table A5 shows that the original regression results are robust. The main estimates are similar in sign, magnitude and significance. There are, however, three novelties in the last regression, when we use all four local taxes. First, mandatory transfers become significant at 5% and positive; this suggests that municipalities that receive higher per capita mandatory transfers also receive higher per capita discretionary transfers, which might contradict hypothesis that mandatory transfers are not manipulable. We discuss further the exogeneity of mandatory transfers in the following section. Second, in Model 8 local taxes are also significant at 5% and negative, which supports the redistributive hypothesis, i.e., municipalities that are able to collect more taxes are richer and, therefore, the federal government does not prioritize them for discretionary transfers.
A6. Mandatory transfers as a dependent variable
In order to confirm that the FPM is indeed an endogenous proxy for mandatory transfers, we performed the following exercise: we rerun our regressions using mandatory transfers as the dependent variable. Table A6 below presents the results of the fixed effects IV regressions for the three proxies for local tax discussed in the previous section. Table A6 shows clearly that our regressions have a very reduced power to explain mandatory transfers. Indeed, only in model (11) is there one variable statistically significant at 1%, Local tax. All other variables are either insignificant or have very low statistical significance. It is true that the main political variable Mayor-President-Only appears significant at 10% in models 10 and 11 and at 5% in model 9. However, their economic significance is extremely reduced. Indeed, by applying the same methodology we used in section IV.B for calculating the marginal effects of explanatory variables, we conclude that throughout the period 1997-2012 the estimated marginal effect of partisan identification was never higher than 4 cents of a US dollar (in 2012 values). The average marginal effect is 3 cents of a US dollar per capita, i.e., according to the most favorable model 9, when the Mayor and the President are members of the same party in a nonaligned state, the municipality receives an extra 3 cents of a (2012) US dollar in mandatory transfers. The authors believe that this result makes it clear that there is no economically significant role of political identification in the implementation of mandatory FPM constitutional transfers in Brazil.
B. The Constitutional FPM fund's transfers rules
In order to better understand the FPM constitutional transfers funds, we present here the rules that define the amount of resources each Brazilian municipality is entitled to receive. To form the fund, the federal government transfers 22.5% of the two main federal taxes: the income tax IR ("Imposto de Renda") and the industrial products tax IPI ("Imposto sobre Produtos Industrializados"). The Brazilian Federal Court of Accounts TCU ("Tribunal de Contas da União"), an independent body, calculates the share of each municipality every year, based on estimations of the municipalities' population counts and the states' per capita income updated yearly by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, IBGE. There are three subcategories of the FPM fund, which we describe below.
(1) 10% of the fund's resources go to the states' capitals according to a sharing rule that is proportional to the capital's population as compared to the total population of all capitals and inversely proportional to the per capita income of the corresponding state. Therefore, a richer state's capital will receive fewer resources than a poorer state's capital with the same population. The population coefficient is calculated according to Table A1 and the per capita income coefficient is calculated according to Table A2 . The final share coefficient is the product of the population coefficient times the per capita income coefficient. Source: Zucco (2014) and Lopez, Bugarin and Bugarin (2015) Note: italics correspond to Zucco (2014) estimates and non-italics correspond to Lopez, Bugarin and Bugarin (2015) 's interpolations.
